At times the compulsory nature of a right (ius cogens) can be a hindrance to achieving the rights of the right holder. The problem is dealt with either in particular by applying general clauses in specific cases or in the context of the interpretation of individual provisions. In fact, however, individual cases or categories of cases, such as those found in Areios Pagos 6/2019 (Plenary), are partly an expression of a broader issue that concerns almost all compulsory rights. This requires a more comprehensive and unified approach. Therefore and contrary to the prevailing opinion, compulsory rights are also subject to resignation either because the abstract assessments justifying their compulsory nature do not apply in the present case or because there is no real need for the protection of the right holder, in particular in view of the compensation received by the resignee. In this light, the legal nature of a right as ius cogens or ius dispositivum is a differentiation of degree and intensity rather than quality.

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