The present study examined whether the traditional view of causality in the law of damages (theory of equivalent conditions as associated with the "all or nothing") requires enlargement, so that, at least in some cases, allowing the perpetrator responsibility, even when the act or omission that creates a liability is merely possible, and not a necessary condition for the occurrence of a critical injury.

Unfair results in leading the traditional concept could be overcome by understanding causality, as a condition for the affirmation of responsibility, not as a requirement of a definite cause and effect relationship (logical causality), but as the probability the damage was caused by conduct constituting a legitimate reason liability (probabilistic causation). Respectively, the compensation, in such an approach, obliged to pay the perpetrator is determined proportionally to the degree of probability constitute the critical act or omission caused the damage.

The study supported that where probabilistic causality proportional responsibility of the perpetrator does not constitute a just dikaiopolitiko (the passage of the law) request, but is content of a rule of law which can be adequately rendered within the existing legal order (de lege lata) and therefore is applicable directly, without the need for any legislative intervention. Under this approach sought the main foundations on which it could be inferred that rule under relevant transcendental (outside the law) further conformation of law. While attempting the integration of analog indemnity liability under current law and the emergence of some key aspects of the problem, l.ch. in relation to the scope of the theory and calculation of compensation due.

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